The rise of Chinese capital globally coincideed with a watershed moment in the history of international markets -the 2008 global nancial crisis. Confronted with shrinking U.S. demand for its exports, China intensi ed its search for third market destinations, employing overseas investment as a tool to create new trade opportunities. While China's 2001 WTO entry had long-ago forged trade ties with Latin America, it hoped that regional investment in infrastructure, construction, and heavy extraction industries could meet two important strategic national goals simultaneously: improving China's access to raw materials and energy supplies, while also securing new export markets to replace those lost to the U.S. recession. Consequently, during a time where Western nancial centers were reeling from the 2008 nancial crisis, growing Chinese economic interdependence offered Latin American governments a potentially new source of capital.
Compared to the short-term horizon of mobile capital that was characteristic of depending nancial integration at the end of the 20th century, the recent emergence of Chinese state-owned capital has some distinct features. Chinese lenders are not terribly different from market-based creditors. They too are concerned with debt repayment, but their long-term horizon differentiates their lending. Their willingness to incur uncertainty today in hopes of a more substantial return later is particularly appealing to those debtors who are frustrated by market-based capital's short-term volatility, and its emphasis on austerity. Market investors have often considered such budgetary restraint a credible signal of sound governance and debt repayment.
However, many developing countries fear that such a governance approach and its capital exit threat might constrain their political agendas, budgetary power, and social responsiveness.
In contrast, China's form of patient capital is often willing to endure emerging market business cycle risk.
It signals such risk tolerance through promises of non-intervention in sovereign affairs. In fact, the rising power has avoided onerous policy conditions, or credit being contingent on a country's macroeconomic performance. Under the guise of non-intervention; however, it also promoted long-term pro t and marketshare opportunties for its rms. In fact, almost three-quarters of Chinese loans support investment in the energy and mining sectors, or infrastructure -a convenient outlet for the country's construction overcapacity.
Because China has largely bene ted from such a patient capital approach, it shows no signs of retreating from Latin America, notwithstanding its slowing growth back home. After lending more than $100 billion to Latin America since 2005 (Gallagher and Myers 2014) , it pledged to invest $250 billion more in the region over the next ten years. In fact, overseas investment is a key part of Beijing's economic adjustment strategy.
To alleviate overcapacity domestically in such sectors as infrastructure, construction, steel, and energy, Chinese of cials leverage development nancing to create opportunities internationally for Chinese rms and workers. In this regard, China's bank nance today is reminiscent of`tied-aid' historically, where credit lines were often extended to developing countries by the U.S. and Japan through commercial bank loans, bilateral development loans, and supplier credits from export-import banks in exchange for the purchase of goods and services from the creditor nation.
Much scholarly attention has focused on the implications of China's deepening trade relationship in Latin America (see Gallagher and Porzecanski 2010) , but Chinese nance has received considerably less attention by scholars, leaving many important questions regarding the rise of Chinese banking in the Western Hemisphere unanswered. Has China's emphasis on non-interference in sovereign affairs removed scal constraints, and thus contributed to some of the region's renewed debt problems? Does China's state-led capital facilitate programmatic shifts away from market-led governance?
In this paper, I show that China's emergence as a new Latin American creditor has restored a patient capital approach to global nance that has allowed the region to escape those budget constraints traditionally imposed by global capital markets (Mahon 1996; McNamara 1999; Mosley 2000; Wibbels 2006; Kaplan 2013) , and international nancial institutions (Thacker 1999; Vreeland 2003; Nelson 2015) . The commodity boom provided such an alternative funding source during the early to mid-2000s, often helping governments increase their budgetary spending (Weyland 2009; Murillo, Oliveros, and Vaishnav 2011; Kaplan 2013) . However, in the wake of the global nancial crisis, a commodity correction left Latin American governments searching for new nancing options.
I expect that the rise of Chinese banking has enhanced governments' scal space, conditional on its domestic investment channel. When Chinese nancing takes the form of state-to-state lending, the funds directly enter government coffers, enabling incumbent politicians to increase their spending on their political agendas. By contrast, when these loans are instead booked to a corporate entity (either a private rm or a separately managed state-owned enterprise) through government concessions, the central government does not bene t from the loan directly. Consequently, they do not secure new budgetary nancing, which creates considerable national variation in China's regional underwriting of public nancing.
I exploit this variation in the type of sovereign nancing to test whether Chinese nancing streams enhance Latin America's scal policy autonomy, and ultimately, yield higher de cit spending. I focus on scal policy not only because of its centrality to market governance, but also because of its importance in understanding government objectives. Indeed, a government's economic priorities are re ected in its national budget, just as a rm or household's preferences are conveyed through its balance sheet.
Given the recent emergence of Chinese global nancing, I employ a comparative case study of two of China's largest debtors -Brazil and Venezuela -before and after the introduction of Chinese credit. I nd that in Venezuela, the once-lofty primary budget surpluses of the mid-2000s have morphed into wide de cits as Chinese state-to-state nancing accounts for a growing share of external public nancing. By contrast, notwithstanding some recent drift from its budget rectitude, Brazil's government has been more disciplined scally than its Andean neighbor. Unlike China's direct, bilateral public nancing of infrastructure and development in Venezuela, public tender is a constitutional requirement in Brazil. It contracts unful lled public services through private procurement, increasing the importance of using budget discipline to signal its good credit standing to private investors. Even amid its economic doldrums, Brazil targets scal restraint in an effort to boost market con dence. I also extend this comparative analysis to China's other major regional debtors, Argentina and Ecuador, nding that the link between Chinese nancing and budgetary expansion may hold more broadly in South America.
These ndings offer new insights for studies examining globalization, neoliberalism, and the Latin American left, which have found considerable variation in the extent of government intervention in national economies. On one side of these debates, scholars have contended that economic integration (Cerny 1995; Rudra 2002) , global capital markets (Mahon 1996; McNamara 1999; Mosley 2000 Mosley , 2003 Wibbels 2006) , and international nancial institutions (Vreeland 2003; Nelson 2015) have led to a retrenchment of Keynesian-style countercylical scal policies in developing countries, including budget de cits and social safety nets. In support of this view, scholars nd that a variety of factors, including a weak labor movement (Roberts, 2002) , party-brand dilution (Lupu, 2014) , strong business interests (Thacker 2000; Faireld 2010) , reform-seeking politicians (Corrales 2000) , centrist economic voters (Baker, 2008; Baker and Greene, 2011) , and increasingly non-economic voters (Hellwig, 2014) helped facilitate a broad-based acceptance of this neoliberal consensus (Stokes, 2001; Murillo, 2002; Weyland, 2002; Levitsky, 2003; Roberts, 2012) . Notwithstanding such policy retrenchment, other scholars nd that neoliberal reforms have not been uniform. Rather, many countries with import substitution industrialization legacies (ISI) crafted political bargains (Frieden, 1991) that preserved supply side economic interventions, including industrial promotion, public employment (Kurtz and Brooks 2008) , labor protection (Carnes 2014) , and social insurance (Wibbels and Ahlquist, 2011) . However, they did not have much macroeconomic exibility (Kurtz and Brooks 2008) .
I engage with this important issue, showing that the emergence of Chinese state-led nancing has endowed governments with greater scal space compared to the market-centric governance.
This study also has signi cant implications for scholars examining the rise of China in Latin America. In the eld of political economy, two main perspectives have dominated the analysis. The rst argument is that Latin America's specialization in primary commodities is complementary to China's economic structure.
Unlike the United States that often seeks to protect politically sensitive agricultural sectors (Frieden 1988) , China is not a source of commodity competition. Rather, China imports the primary goods that Latin American produces cheaply and ef ciently. Hence, rebalancing trade ties with China should improve the region's welfare (Santiso 2007) . By contrast, others are more skeptical of China, suggesting that its regional trade pattern reinforces Latin American dependency through an over-reliance on commodity specialization and an inability to compete with China's cheap manufacturing goods (Wise and Quiliconi 2007; Moreira 2007; Gallagher and Porzecanski 2010; Jenkins 2012; Ortiz 2012.) This asymmetric relationship leaves the region exposed to a severe commodity correction that could impair Latin American development. My argument seeks to complement this literature on Chinese integration by offering a systematic examination of how this structural transformation affects the policy choices of individual Latin American nations.
The international relations literature re ects a similar dichotomy, with scholars arriving at divergent conclusions about the security implications of growing Chinese-Latin American interdependence. The`realist' perspective is deeply suspicious of Chinese motives (Mearsheimer 2001) , perceiving China's Western Hemispheric expansion as part of a geopolitical strategy to mitigate U.S. hegemonic power (Lanxin 2008 ).
Other scholars have offered a more nuanced assessment of China's regional role, but they are nevertheless cautious about the country's aspirations. Battling an increasingly negative image in the wake of the in ux of low-end manufacturing exports to Latin America, China has funneled billions of dollars into improving its global reputation. Whether investing in "soft power" yields dividends, however, remains unclear amid ongoing concerns about its economic threat, corrupt business practices, human rights record, and growing military power (Shambaugh 2013) . Notwithstanding these multi-dimensional concerns, many thinkers suggest that China's presence in Latin America is primarily driven by economics, offering less of a challenge to U.S. regional in uence (Roett and Paz 2008; Stallings 2008; Tokatlian 2008) . In other words, China primarily hopes to secure raw materials for its home market and a destination for its manufactured goods in foreign markets. Political stability is central to these goals, and hence, China has little interest in sparking antiAmerican sentiment, or participating in populist institutions like the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA). Rather, China has broad, cross-ideological relationships in Latin America (Domínguez 2006) . My analysis brings a new set of considerations to this work by employing a systematic comparative analysis of the shifting economic power balance between the United States and China. The Chinese government's stated intentions for its Latin American expansion include securing access to energy and raw material resources for its domestic market and developing internationally-competitive rms (Chen 2008) . However, government of cials appear to prioritize more than simply commerce when they discuss the importance of "creating a more multipolar world and increasing the democratization of international relations," 1 and their state-sponsored think tanks condemn neoliberalism as an ideological tool of American power (Ferchen 2013b) . While assessing China's political motivations is beyond this paper's scope, the heft of its rising regional footprint has important policy implications. Even if we assume that China has benign diplomatic intentions, it unquestionably has become a huge economic player -a role that may have unintended political consequences given that China's global economics and politics are often inextricably linked (Flores-Macías and Kreps 2013). I expect that Chinese state-to-state lending endows governments with more room to maneuver compared to a market-based approach that emphasizes minimal economic intervention.
The article unfolds as follows. The next section contains the main theoretical contribution; here I explain how the emergence of Chinese state-to-state lending has increased national policy discretion relative to traditional market governance models of sovereign borrowing. I then provide qualitative support for this theory using a comparative case study analysis of two of China's largest Latin American debtors, Brazil and Venezuela, which vary in their government's reliance on state-to-state lending. I then extend the analysis to Argentina and Ecuador, two of China's other major South American debtors, to observe if these patterns hold elsewhere in the region. Finally, I close by discussing the study's broader scholarly implications.
Theoretical Framework: Patient Capital Boosts Policy Flexibility
The globalization scholarship has long-debated the extent to which greater economic interdependence compels governments to curtail their policy autonomy. Within the seminal debate between convergence and divergence thinkers, both schools of thought agree that mobile capital pressured government to adopt laissezfaire economic policies. They differ on the question of whether or not states had the capacity to respond to these pressures. Convergence thinkers anticipate a`race to the bottom' where states have little power to resist the interests of capital owners, 2 while divergence thinkers are more optimistic about states' capacity, 1 Xinhuanet, June 8, 2013 . 2 Lindblom 1977 Frieden 1991; Helleiner 1994; Cerny 1995; Keohane and Milner 1996; Strange 1996. expecting that governments could increase their role in the economy to offset globalization's dislocations. 3 I engage with this important issue, developing new insights about the nature of global capital in an era of rising state-led capitalism. I contend that state-led capitalism is an important form of patient capital.
Unlike the short-term horizon of private market capital, patient capital is characterized by both a longterm horizon and long-term relationships (Kahler 1998; Wade 1998) . While market-based capital has to outperform short-term industry benchmarks (Mosley 2003) and maintain pro tability to appease corporate board of directors, patient capital is typically willing to forgo an immediate return in anticipation of more substantial returns later. Compared to the nancial volatility of market-based nancing (Calvo 1998; Armijo 1999) , scholars have found that the personal or geopolitical ties associated with international bank lending (Frieden 1987) and global development aid (Clough 1992) were historically more likely to demonstrate patience. A more recent literature suggests that domestic and international nancial systems based on such patient capital yields dramatically different outcomes for nancial stability (Max eld and Hardie 2013) and national economic policymaking respectively (Kaplan 2013) .
The emergence of state-owned capital represents the latest manifestation of patient capital in the global nancial system. These state-owned creditors do not have to abide by such near-term criteria because they are backed by their governments' implicit guarantee of their loan portfolios should their debtors encounter nancial distress. Moreover, their home governments are also typically intimately involved in crafting their global operations strategy, meaning the lines between business and politics are often blurred. For example, China articulates its focus on long-term pro tibility, and its willingness to endure emerging market volatility as a development opportunity created by South-to-South complementaries.
I contend that these characteristics of state-owned creditors transform the traditional relationship between global economic interdependence and national policy autonomy. Its long-term horizon and geopolitical shrewdness makes state-owned capital less likely to exit a debtor country. Without the threat of short-term capital withdrawal, national governments have considerably more room to maneuver. They are less prone to austerity-inducing credit shocks that spike their nancing costs and impede governments from spending on their political constituencies. By mitigating globalization's constraint on national governments, state-owned capital may thus allow Latin American politicians to be more socially responsive, upending the globalization's traditional tension between markets and society. A country's room to maneuver often re ects its government's scal space, or the availability of resources to fund budget shortfalls. For developing country governments facing strong redistributive pressures, sufcient scal space to supply more jobs, higher wages, and better public services is often key to their political survival. To nance such domestic political agendas, however, developing country governments often must borrow externally to a much greater extent than rich countries. Indeed, underdeveloped nancing markets and tax collection leaves these governments with considerably fewer internal funding options than developed countries (Gavin and Perotti 1997) . Without such nancing, governments lack the capacity to fund their domestic political initiatives and respond to economic shocks countercyclically with de cit spending (Pinto 2010) . For example, a Keynesian policy response like the U.S.'s massive de cit spending during its 2008 crisis has historically been more dif cult for crisis-ridden developing countries. 6 From Private Capital to Public Creditor: An End to Austerity?
Despite this historic pattern of budget retrenchment, I expect that the availability of patient capital from a unitary sovereign creditor like China increases debtors' room to maneuver. Rather than pursuing market austerity to attract bond market capital during hard times, governments that either defaulted on their debt or 4 Levitsky and Roberts (2011) de ne the left as "political actors who seek to employ public authority to protect individuals and groups from market insecurities, reduce social and economic inequalities, and strengthen the voice of underpriveleged groups."
5 The global credit crunch rst began during the fall of 2007 when the UK government nationalized the beleaguered Northern Rock, a British mortgage lender.
6 Much of Latin America was able to pursue countercylical policies for the rst time during the 2008 global nancial crisis.
refused to comply with market conditionality could instead spend freely on their political priorities.
The link between Chinese credit and national policy orientation has both an international and domestic dimension. First, the emergence of Chinese international lending has important implications for the structure of sovereign debt nancing, elevating the role of geopolitics in creditors' investment decisions. I
anticipate that state-centric nancing extends sovereign borrowers' room to maneuver because of its longertime horizon compared to market-based capital. This relationship, however, is conditional on the domestic investment channel. When patient capital is funneled directly to central government coffers, an incumbent government is likely to consider them revenues, and increase its spending. By contrast, when these loans are instead booked to a corporate entity (either a private rm or a separately managed state-owned enterprise), the central government does not bene t from the loan directly.
The International Dimension: An Emergence of a New Global Creditor
With state-to-state lending, politics and economics are integrally tied together. For example, the international political economy literature on foreign aid ows has found that aid is often directed to strategicallyimportant countries (see Vreeland and Dreher 2014) . Similar to this study, the foreign aid literature has also found that policy discretion is often conditional on whether funds are allocated through the government or non-state actors (Winters 2010; Dietrich 2013) . In contrast to such development nance, China's bank lending to developing countries is not considered to be Of cial Development Assistance (ODA). Rather, large international loans from Chinese policy banks, such as the China Development Bank (CDB) and China's Exim Bank, tend to fall outside such traditional aid channels (Bräutigam 2011) .
Notwithstanding these categorical differences, Chinese bank loans are also geopolitical, often targeting countries with abundant natural resources and energy supplies that can help China secure long-term access to these vital national assets. For example, China's Central Economic Work Conference this past December 7 touted the ongoing importance of the country's`Going Global Strategy,' which encourages Chinese investment and lending overseas, to its overall national economic agenda. 8 Beyond achieving energy and natural resource security, Chinese of cials also view outbound investment as one way of adjusting to China's new normal' of slower but higher quality economic activity. By strengthening`global industry cooperation', the government can help create opportunities for Chinese rms and workers abroad in sectors facing 7 Xinhua, December 11, 2014. 8 China has also promoted the use of its currency internationally with this strategy (Steinberg 2014; McDowell and Liao 2014 Compared to private capital, I expect that such state-to-state lending is less likely to lead to capital ight.
Operating in a world of quarterly and yearly performance benchmarks (Datz 1999) , Western private capital tends to manage credit risks with short-term policy metrics such as budget discipline and in ation control in lieu of other economic policies with longer-term implications (Mosley 2003) . Compelling such austerity might in part re ect a U.S. ideological agenda, but it also seeks to protect creditor interests by bolstering state nances, and hence, the chances of debt repayment. That said, it gives debtor governments less room to maneuver because the failure to meet market metrics can spur capital out ows and credit shocks.
By contrast, Chinese bankers tend to incorporate the national interest in their bottom line, seeking to foster China's long-term access to global trade and investment networks. This convergence of economic and political goals yields a different perception of sovereign risk. For example, Zhao Changhui, Chief Country Risk Analyst for China Eximbank says that Chinese bankers prefer to establish "new business practices" with their borrowers. Freed from the shackles of short-term pro tability, they emphasize investment continuity and long-term objectives, while accepting that some projects will "generate higher pro ts, others less or 9 Xinhua, May 25, 2015. 10 Author's interview in Beijing, China on April 1, 2015.
zero." 11 Similarly, the China Development Bank's (CDB) Vice Governor Liu Kegu, explains that "CDB of cials don't use Western risk measurements," 12 placing a higher premium on securing valuable assets like commodities and natural resources than traditional debt sustainability ratios, such as debt-to-GDP.
Chinese investors thus tend to impose less onerous short-term policy conditions than the stringent borrower conditionality required by private investors and Western lending institutions. They operate under an of cial doctrine of non-intervention in domestic affairs, as stipulated in the country's Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. 13 For instance, China's State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) includes "respect [ing] the laws and policies of the country being invested in and respect [ing] local customs" as one of its primary principles in its foreign investment guidelines. Chinese institutions are thus willing to extend nancing arrangements and direct investment to countries whose governments have been shunned from global markets for their non-compliance with Western governance standards.
If not through conditionality, how does China mitigate the potential for higher-than-expected credit risk? Government lending is secured either through commodity-backed loans, which are collateralized by future commodity deliveries, or by guaranteed contracts with Chinese state-owned enterprises. By reducing their exposure to default risk with commercial ties rather than policy conditions, these policy banks can simultaneously promote the interests of the Chinese state globally. They underwrite credit risk through promises of future business to extend the web of regional Chinese contractors, businesses, and workers.
The Domestic Dimension: The Local Investment Channel
Does such a longer-term view of credit risk management immediately translate to greater discretion for governments seeking greater budgetary autonomy? I contend that achieving such scal latitude ultimately depends on the underlying structure of the market and the state; speci cally whether a government acts as an intermediary for Chinese bank loans. Chinese loans to Latin American nations typically ow through one of two main conduits. They are either disbursed directly to national governments in the form of public nance, or instead extended to companies that have won government concessions for unful lled public services. I expect that governments increase their scal space, or the capacity to fund wider budget de cits, when they receive Chinese credit directly into their coffers. By contrast, when these loans are instead channeled outside the central government to a corporate entity, it does not gain any additional budgetary autonomy outside of those revenues that may indirectly result from China-fueled economic growth.
Chinese loans are classi ed correspondingly because this study aims to understand the relationship between Chinese loans, scal policy, and debt accumulation. According to the IMF's Government Statistics Manual, state-owned enterprises are not included in public debt calculations when they are a market producer, or a producer that sells its goods for economically signi cant prices. Moreover, many state-owned rms like Petrobras in Brazil, are more like private rms in their nancing pro le because they raise large amounts of funds from private capital markets. While Petrobras is currently involved in a corruption scandal tied to the government's political party, such public linkages do not change its classi cation as a corporate entity. Indeed, both public and private rms may be subject to engage in such corruption. That said, when funds from state-owned enterprises are transferred to the national government, they are included in our debt calculations. For example, Venezuela's government development fund, FONDEN, receives transfers from its state-owned oil company, PDVSA, which have then been jointly allocated to the China-Venezuela Joint Fund (Fondo Conjunto Chino-Venezolano, FCCV), along with loans from Chinese policy banks.
The theoretical priors of a Chinese-infused scal expansion are in line with the expectations of the rentier state literature, which argues that natural resource booms help nance unsustainably-high government spending (Weyland 2009; Ross 1999; and Karl 1997) . This phenomenon was exhibited most recently in countries like Ecuador and Venezuela during the 2000's commodity bonanza. With a relatively small portion of government revenues derived from the domestic tax base, national budgetary operations are reliant on commodity-generated revenues. Global commodity corrections thus often precipitate severe scal adjustments unless governments nd alternative funding. With the onset of commodity volatility in 2008, Chinese credit has provided such funding, helping governments delay adjustment and underwrite scal expansion.
Without such a Chinese funding infusion into government coffers; however, I expect governments to have less budgetary exibility. In Brazil, for example, Chinese bank loans are often channelled directly to corporate entities through private procurement. With public tender for government services a constitutional requirement, 14 Chinese credit is typically funneled to rms with successful government bids in exchange for contracts and services with Chinese suppliers. For example, after winning a 2010 public bid to build a 3G telecommunications network, Nextel Brazil received a $500 million loan from the China Development Bank in exchange for sourcing its 3G network infrastructure from Chinese telecommunications equipment manufacturer Huawei Technologies.
14 Section XXI of Article 37 of the 1998 Brazilian constitution requires that public services are contracted through public tender.
In summary, given China's long-term view of credit risk management, I expect Chinese bilateral credit is unlikely to yield the same capital ow volatility as market-based nancing. When allocated directly to national governments, it can thus increase the political room to maneuver.
Comparative Case Evidence
To test the above theoretical priors, I conduct a comparative case study analysis across two countries, Brazil and Venezuela, before and after the emergence of Chinese bilateral credit. These two countries are similar along economic and political indicators: they are presidential, high middle-income South American countries that are among the largest Latin American debtors to China, yet they maximize the variation in the main independent variables of interest (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994) -the domestic investment channel for Chinese lending. I also extend this analysis to two additional middle-income debtors, Argentina and Ecuador, to help observe if the theoretical priors hold more broadly.
I focus the analysis on these four countries given their mixed-market orientation, expecting that budgetary drift may be more likely than in liberal market economies. A variety of economic measures suggest that Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela have mixed-market economies, particularly relative to their upper-middle income counterparts: Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Uruguay. For example, the Wall Street Journal and the Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom considers Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela, to have considerably fewer market freedoms in terms of trade barriers, capital constraints, and nancial insulation from government intervention. This relationship is corroborated by the World Bank's Doing Business Survey, which routinely ranks these four countries outside its top-100 ranking in contrast to its more market-oriented regional peers.
However, even among these mixed-market economies, there is considerable variation in their domestic governance structures for public investment, with some countries like Brazil more likely to exhibit liberal market features. For example, the majority of public investment on roads, railways, trains, ports, and energy infrastructure is typically nanced with private capital through constitutionally-required public tender.
Recall that I expect the budgetary effects of Chinese loans to be conditional on this domestic investment channel. When funds are allocated directly to central government, political leaders are likely to take advantage of the lack of policy conditions and increase their de cit spending. By contrast, when these bank loans are instead booked directly to a corporate entity (including state-owned enterprises), governments do not gain additional policy exibility.
To measure these economic policy changes over time, we can take advantage of the discontinuity created by the global nancial crisis, which marked the emergence of Chinese credit as a viable alternative to Western nancing. Before this shock, we should observe relative adherence to scal discipline in the region, even among traditional skeptics of Western governance in Ecuador and Venezuela. After the global nancial crisis; however, when China begins to promptly expand its direct regional lending ties, we should observe a greater extent of scal drift among governments that directly receive these funds in their coffers.
Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate this pattern. Based on data collected from a variety of sources (including Latin American nance and planning ministries, U.S. SEC lings of foreign governments, investment bank reports, AidData, and the Inter-American Dialogue's China-Latin American Database), Table 1 illustrates total loans from Chinese policy banks to Latin America's four largest debtor nations. Brazil and Venezuela, on average, received the largest amount of nominal loans annually since the global nancial crisis. However, when classifying these loans according to whether or they are distributed directly to central governments (see Table 2 ), there is considerable variation between the four debtor countries. For example, Brazilian loans fall to virtually nil because they are predominately channeled through procurement with corporate entities. ** Tables 1 and 2**   In Table 2 , a pattern emerges over time and space with Chinese state-to-state loans. Fiscal de cits tend to widen as these loans accounts for a larger share of governments' total external public nancing. In the ve years preceding the global nancial crisis -with such state-to-state lending averaging less then 5 percent of their external nancing -Argentina, Ecuador, and Venezuela posted annual budget surpluses that ranged from 0.75 to 2.38 percent of GDP. However, in the wake of the global nancial crisis, these surpluses became de cits with the rise of Chinese state-to-state bank loans. In the ve years following the crisis, these type of bank loans accounted for 12, 26.4, and 45.1 percent respectively of public external nancing. Correspondingly, these same three countries witnessed a scal deterioration of 2.1, 3.5 and 5.1 percentage points respectively. Figure 1 shows their aggregate deterioration, which is even more pronounced when adjusting for discretionary spending associated with Venezuela's off-balance sheet development fund. **Figure 1** By contrast, in Brazil, where the majority of Chinese bank loans are booked to corporate entities (in-cluding state-owned enterpries) rather than the central government, we observe a pattern of scal discipline (see Table 2 ). In light of the recent political scandal in Brazil involving Petrobras and the government's party, we could instead account for the possibility that some Chinese loans made to Petrobras were siphoned to the central government. Even with such a robustness check, however, these loans would amount to less than 5 percent of the government's external nancing.
With the market primarily acting as the intermediary, policy makers have not been able to gain greater scal policy exibility since the onset of Chinese credit (see Table 2 ). Notwithstanding lackluster growth today, for instance, Brazilian nance ministers, such as Joaquim Levy and Nelson Barbosa, have continued to emphasize the importance of "the sustainability of public nances." 15 In line with this commitment and despite some recent drift, the Brazilian government averaged a primary budget surplus of almost 2 percent of GDP in the ve years following the crisis.
Even if Chinese bank lending were to signi cantly expand, Brazil's private procurement system would likely ensure that the government continues to target budget discipline. For example, China pledged $50 billion for a Brazilian infrastructure project fund in May 2015, but it will be channeled through the Brazilian bank, Caixa Economica Federal, and used to support procurement projects.
In the following pages, I rst examine the comparative cases of China's two largest Latin American debtors: Brazil and Venezuela. Examining scal governance before and after the introduction of Chinese credit, I exploit the variation in government reliance on Chinese funding sources. I assess the extent to which direct state nancing endows governments with the expected policy autonomy outlined above, while adjudicating against such alternative explanations as the 2000's commodity boom. In evaluating this claim, I employ a counterfactual analysis, establishing that without Chinese state-to-state lending, politicians have to rely on market nancing sources, making scal austerity more likely. While the commodity boom initially sustained high government spending, I argue that non-conditional Chinese bank lending has helped compensate for falling government commodity revenues since the 2008 global nancial crisis. Finally, I
brie y extend this analysis to two additional South American debtors, Argentina and Ecuador, to observe whether or not these patterns may hold more generally in the region. 
Venezuela: Chinese State-to-State Lending Offsets Commodity Correction
Venezuela has often exhibited the classic symptoms of the resource curse (see Karl 1997; Ross 1999) .
Politicians ride the wave of commodity booms, spending without bounds until crashing on the economy's shores. Typically, during a commodity downturn, Venezuelan politicians pursue scal adjustment to receive a funding lifeline from global market creditors and the IMF.
In the wake of the last crisis-driven commodity correction, however, Venezuela was buoyed by direct Chinese lending to its government that averaged $19 billion annually, or nearly half of the country's total external nancing. This new nancing has been instrumental in funding massive state spending on social projects, known as misiones programs, which average about US$15.2 billion per year. 16 Chinese nancing also helped free Venezuela's budgetary choices from the scrutiny of the international investment community.
Excluding off-balance sheet spending, the Hugo Chávez administration moved from an average primary budget surplus of nearly 1 percent of GDP annually to average de cits of more than 4 percent of GDP following the global nancial crisis (see Table 2 ). Notably, this de cit would be about 2.3 percentage points higher (see Figure 1) , if we were to consider Chinese loans to PDVSA as direct government borrowing. 17 Without Chinese nancing, it is hard to imagine that state intervention on such a scale would have been possible on the heels of the commodity correction. The availability of a non-market nancing stream without traditional conditionality appears to have given Venezuela greater policy autonomy. Perhaps, the late Venezuela president, Hugo Chávez, most aptly describes this policy latitude, when he lauded Chinese lending after being able to spend countercyclically during the global nancial crisis: "It differs from other multilateral loans because it comes with no strings attached, unlike the scrutiny of international nances." 18 In the following pages, I'll explore this counterfactual of whether or not Venezuela could have intervened in the economy as aggressively without Chinese nancing. Through this analysis, I'll evaluate my theoretical claim against the alternative explanation that Venezuela's post-crisis policies t those typically associated with the commodity boom-and-bust cycle.
Oil has long been the lifeline of Venezuelan politics, delivering more than US$1 trillion into state coffers over the last 60 years, creating its well-known paradox of plenty. Without the accountability that de-rives from broad taxation, 19 politicians frequently and freely spend today with little concern for the health of nances tomorrow. Venezuelan politicians thus refer to budgetary spending with a sense of determinism, declaring that "oil booms create an illusion of endless scal expansion possibilities." 20 For example, Venezuela's three previous oil booms all ended in scal crises characterized by depressed oil prices and empty government coffers. Even the free-spending Hugo Chávez oversaw a scal retrenchment when his presidency began in 1998 after oil had its worst price collapse since the 1970s.
At rst glance, the most recent commodity boom appears to t this pattern neatly. Between 2004 and 2009, oil proceeds amounted to 62 percent of total government revenues, helping fuel a spending boom.
Notably; however, when oil prices collapsed after the 2008 global crisis, Chávez was able to avoid cutting spending this time, which led a wider budget de cit (see Figure 2) . If the government's spending exibility was straightforwardly determined by the price of commodities, it would be reasonable to expect some scal consolidation considering the lack of alternative funding possibilities. Similar to early episodes in Venezuelan history, of cial government oil receipts fell precipitously. 21 balance sheet obligations, Kegu was comforted by the country's rich oil reserves. 22 "We have lots of capital and lack resources, they have lots of resources and lack capital, so it's complementary" (Ferchen 2013a) . the lack of reinvestment in the state oil company was not only hurting PDVSA's productivity, 24 but also forcing it to increasingly borrow from global capital markets. By 2011, PDVSA's debt had reached $35 billion -equivalent to the amount it had funneled through FONDEN -meaning the state-oil company had effectively nanced a massive subsidy to the government for its social programs. Borrowing at high interest rates from global markets while siphoning its oil proceeds directly to the Venezuelan central government, however, was not sustainable over the long-run.
Without Chinese lending, the central government would have thus had to borrow more in global capital markets. In 2010, the major credit rating agencies -S&P, Moody's, and Fitch -had already rated Venezuela's sovereign debt below investment grade, meaning new funding would not have come cheap.
Incurring more debt would have likely subjected Venezuela to greater investor scrutiny and thus austerity.
In the wake of Chávez's 2013 death, his successor Nicolás Maduro has continued to use Chinese loanfor-oil agreements as a funding arm for its expenditures. The Maduro government borrows from China, often below its market rate, to boost politically-important spending today. However, with about one-half of its 640,000 barrels of daily oil production being sold to China, 25 such borrowing comes at the cost of the state-oil company's health tomorrow. While PDVSA has always underwritten the Venezuelan government with its current proceeds, its now leveraging its future oil assets and pro tability to keep the government in the black, casting a cloud over the country's future solvency. 22 Venezuela holds 20 percent of the world's crude oil reserves, much of which is extra-heavy crude from the Orinoco Oil Belt. 23 PDVSA; FONDEN. 24 The state oil company was producing about 3 million dollars of oil daily compared to its goal of 4 million dollars. 25 Financial Times, October 22, 2014.
These loan-for-oil agreements also create a moral hazard problem for China that is comparable to the one experienced by U.S. banks during the 1980's Latin American debt crisis. During that crisis, banks rst extended new money to Latin American borrowers, in hopes of recovering their initial investments and avoiding further sovereign defaults that would undercut their own pro tability. But their losses mounted by decade's end, forcing them to write off their bad loans.
China could be headed for a similar situation. If Chinese banks were to cut their nancing to Venezuela out of concern that the country's ongoing spending might jeopardize its credit standing, a likely default could impede the ow of Venezuela's oil shipments to China. On the other hand, if China continues to extend new credit to Venezuela, it may temporarily stave off any potential nancial dif culties. However, such defensive lending risks further catalyzing moral hazard. The Maduro government may prefer to spend rather than reform, sowing the seeds for an even deeper debt crisis.
To date, China has opted to continue lending, helping sustain a Venezuelan government that would have otherwise had little choice but to pursue a scal adjustment following the commodity downturn. For example, it funneled another $10 billion to the crisis-ridden country in 2015 (or about one-quarter of Venezuela's external debt). At Venezuela's request, China also loosened the terms for one tranche of the loan-for-oil agreements by both removing the minimum quantities for oil shipments and extending the deadline for repayments. Over the long run, the question is how long China is willing to extend such preferential conditions. Currently, China's internal policy debate centers on whether the bene ts of securing a cheap, long-run energy supply outweigh the current economic volatility. But, at what point might China play a role all too familiar to the West: attempting to mitigate the politics of excess with the politics of austerity? Surprisingly, some public bankers have already inched in this direction, advocating for greater "collaboration in the formulation of policies" within China's non-intervention framework. 26 In fact, China Development Bank's most recent $5 billion loan is geared toward improving oil production through upgrading and reform.
Brazil: Private Procurement Reduces Policy Discretion
I have argued that China's`no strings attached' approach to their economic relations offers countries autonomy from international investors' scrutiny over their nances, and ultimately greater budgetary exibility. However, greater Chinese lending alone does not necessarily lead to greater policy discretion -it's dependent on whether or not the central government receives direct Chinese funding. Let us now consider 26 Zhao Changhui, Chief Country Risk Analyst, China Eximbank (see footnote 11).
another country case where Chinese credit is channeled outside the government to corporate entitities. If my theoretical priors are correct, we should observe considerably less scal policy room to maneuver.
In nominal terms, Brazil is China's second largest Latin American debtor. However, rather than funding the Brazilian government, Chinese policy banks typically offer project nance meant to help Chinese rms secure winning bids for public services. The Brazilian government instead funds its operations through a mix of domestic taxation, 27 and private procurement, while turning to global markets to nance any revenue shortfalls. In fact, capital markets have supplied 47 percent of Brazil's external nancing since 2007. 28 Brazil thus represents an ideal case for analyzing the post-commodity boom choices of governments that do not tap Chinese nancing. Without such non-conditional bilateral lending, the Brazilian government was able to employ scal stimulus to offset the 2008 global nancial crisis, and also maintain a relatively accommodative stance for many years. However, the government has not had suf cient budgetary space to tread far from Western governance principles of scal responsibility. In fact, the government has increasing less scope to administer countercyclical policies amid its severe economic downturn, with its global creditors calling for greater scal austerity rather than stimulus.
Whether or not austerity is the best policy solution is beyond the scope of this paper; however, the Venezuelan case raises an important counterfactual question. If Chinese state-to-state lending grants Latin American politicians greater economic exibility, why hasn't the cash-strapped Brazilian government engaged Chinese bankers more directly? Let us journey to Brazil to examine these patterns more closely.
Undoubtedly, Brazil bene ted from its relationship with China, whose commodity demand catalyzed a mid-2000s export boom which helped buoy the economy, and consequently government tax receipts. These added revenues, along with sound macroeconomic fundamentals, allowed the Lula da Silva administration to respond countercyclically to the 2008 global crisis. Even though the crisis tapered the commodity boom, the Lula government was able to use its strong scal position to stimulate the economy, 29 helping it grow by a yearly average of 4.1 percent between 2008 and 2010.
Notwithstanding such bene ts of growing Chinese interdependence, the Brazilian government has not directly turned to Chinese policy banks for nancing (see Table 2 ). To the extent that China's policy banks are involved in public nancing projects, they operate through constitutionally-mandated government concessions rather than direct government-to-government lending like in Venezuela. In opting to rely on private procurement for much of Brazil's public services, the country continues to operate within the con nes of an economic model grounded in budget discipline. Brazil has been less interventionist than its regional counterparts with mixed-market economies. Why?
Compared to Chinese public bankers, nancial markets are far less forgiving about large budget de cits and in ation, fretting that they not only erode investor con dence, but also the country's debt repayment This market-imposed discipline can create an unenviable balancing act for sitting Brazilian presidents.
During her rst term, President Dilma Rousseff sought to preserve Brazil's hard-won macroeconomic stability, while struggling to overcome economic headwinds and reignite growth. To achieve these twin goals, she allowed a vigilant central bank to check in ation, while employing the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) as a tool to nance the expansion of industry and infrastructure. President Rousseff also provided electricity and education subsidies, while targeted poverty through the Bolsa Familia program, which grants cash stipends to 48 million poor Brazilians, or one quarter its population.
Further adding to these pressures was the seemingly irreconcilable demand for greater social spending.
In the summer of 2013, millions of people rst took to the streets to voice their discontent with the quality of public services and the sky-high price tag for World Cup and Olympic stadiums. Facing plummeting approval ratings, 31 Rousseff swiftly responded with a set of proposals to curb corruption and increase government investment in education, health, and public transportation. Improving the quality and accessibility of such public services is no small feat, however, and necessitates massive new spending commitments.
Placating the growing demands of Brazil's middle class thus created a political quagmire, where higher spending threatened to undermine budget discipline, and thereby Brazil's investment climate. Indeed, fast 30 Author's interview, October 27, 2014. 31 Rouseff's approval fell by more than 20 percentage points following July's protests (Ibope 2013; Datafohla 2013). forward three years, and President Rousseff is faced with the prospect of potentially cutting politicallyimportant social programs to bolster Brazil's deteriorating credit standing. At the same time, her own political capital has sunk to historic lows amid corruption scandals and impeachment hearings.
Controversially, during her 2014 re-election bid, Rousseff's balancing act had reached the boundaries of her scal safety net. Her social spending commitments and corporate subsidies were politically dif cult to trim; and contributed to a narrowing of Brazil's targeted primary budget surplus -a key gauge of debt service capacity -to 1.9 percent of GDP prior to the election year compared to 2.5 percent of GDP in 2008.
Moreover, President Dilma Rousseff had such little scal exibility that she tried to mask a budgetary de cit with state bank credit, an accounting practice that is illegal under the country's scal responsibility law, and possible grounds for her impeachment. That said, given Brazil's reliance on capital markets, the Rousseff government is nonetheless attempting to return to budget balance this year, with its proposed social spending cuts and nancial transactions tax.
In searching for an exit from this quagmire, one might think that the government would be tempted to directly borrow from Chinese banks. Certainly, China's US$10 billion loan package to the highly-indebted Petrobras is likely to help its new management navigate rocky nancial waters amid its ongoing corruption scandal. Why wouldn't the federal government follow course? According to Ambassador Carlos Marcio Cozendey, the current Secretary of International Affairs at the Brazilian Ministry of Finance, Chinese lending was historically considered a less attractive nancing option, given its foreign content stipulations.
"China investment in Brazil took a long time to start because they had some expectations that we would not ful ll -in terms of how they would come in, and how they would control the processes; the story we have everywhere that China wants to come, and bring the workers, and bring everything -but this is not possible in Brazil, you cannot bring your laborers, you have to hire them here...we simply applied the rules, and so they did not come." 32 Ironically, Brazil preferred to borrow with policy conditionality rather than give preferential treatment to Chinese suppliers and laborers, which has in turn limited its degree of maneuverability. development bank, BNDES. However, the project was repeatedly stalled due local content disagreements.
The China Ex-Im Bank sought a larger share of labor, services, and goods procured in China, but Brazil was not willing to make concessions given its strict labor and local content laws (Alves 2013 ).
Brazil's decision to pursue multiple sources of nance may also re ect its rms' distrust of Chinese motivations, and its perceptions that the in ux of cheap Chinese manufactured goods has contributed tò deindustrialization.' In fact, a 2014 study by Exame, a leading business magazine in Brazil, found that about one-third of Brazilian entrepreneurs view Asian competitors as`threats' to Brazil.
If the Brazilian government is not willing to pay the cost of Chinese content for greater scal exibility, how else might it exit the current crisis? Rather than directly tapping Chinese resources to help fund its de cit; the Rousseff government appears to be pursuing a more intermediate solution. It can outsource public services to the Brazilian private sector through government concessions. To increase productivity and revive economic growth, Brazilian of cials announced a $64 billion infrastructure package last summer.
China has emerged as a potential suitor, but at greater arms-length from the government than in Venezuela given Brazil's public tender laws. Helping pave the way for such cooperation was China's increasing willingness to adjust its investment content expectations. For example, China reduced its equipment and machinery Unlike China's direct government-to-government nancing of Venezuela, China's credit is channeled to the Brazilian private sector through Caixa Economic Federal, a public bank with expertise in infrastructure, housing, and urban development. Outside of being a scal for the government's social policies, it lends very little to the public sector, with about 94 percent of all loans destined to the private sector (Mettenheim 2006 ). The Chinese credit line, accounting for 8 percent of the Caixa's assets, will help Brazil nance much-needed infrastructure projects through private procurement. Importantly, however, it will also allow the federal government to reduce its subsidies to state-owned banks like Caixa -which have amounted to about 10 percent of GDP since 2008, and contributed to Brazil's deteriorating credit environment.
In summary, the Brazilian government has not turned to Chinese banks to underwrite a scal expansion because of its need to court scally-conservative private investors for government concessions. However, it has employed Chinese lending indirectly to simultaneously meet its twin goals of economic and social stability. Chinese credit lines to Brazilian rms not only provide space for the government to curtail its subsidies to state development banks, but also defrays the cost of big-ticket capital projects by helping spur private procurement. If Brazil's recession-busting infrastructure plan works, it will appease markets and society by allowing for both a return to market-sanctioned austerity and improved public services. If it fails, however, it could intensify its turmoil by further increasing the indebtedness of its state-owned banks.
Case Extensions: Argentina and Ecuador
To examine whether or not the relationship between patient capital and government spending holds beyond Brazil and Venezuela, I brie y extend the analysis to two more Chinese debtor nations: Argentina and Ecuador. Both of these countries became debtors to China following the global nancial crisis; however, their governments' loan exposure to China varied as a share of their total external public nancing. Total Chinese loans to Ecuador were more than double those loans extended to Argentina. At the same time, while both countries incurred a sustained scal deterioration after the global nancial crisis, Argentina's decline was less pronounced (see Table 2 ).
I suspect that much of this pattern re ects Argentina's slower pace in courting Chinese bank loans compared to Ecuador. Similar to Brazil, Argentina had a public works law that required public bidding for all major infrastructure projects. It wasn't until 2014 that the country passed the Bilateral Agreement on Economic Cooperation and Investment with China, allowing the Argentine government to forego public bidding if Chinese banks offered nancing. Until then, the Argentine government -which has been shunned from global nancial markets -was desperately seeking out new government revenues in the aftermath of the global commodity corrrection. In the years following the crisis, President Cristina Kirchner's administration squeezed tax margins on unpopular export taxes, nationalized the country's private pensions systems, and tweaked domestic laws to redirect central bank reserves toward nancing national accounts.
During the last few years of the Kirchner administration, Argentina took a cue from its Andean neighbors, increasingly looking to China's growing investment-led regional integration to nance its domestic political agenda. Argentina turned to Chinese credit to help fund its infrastructure plans and bolster its sagging reserves after its technical default in the summer of 2014. However, with Maurico Macri's recent election victory, his center-right government has pledged to review the most recently signed Chinese investment deals. He also appears more likely to channel such prospective investment through the private sector in contrast to Cristina Kirchner's proclivity to negotiate state-to-state agreements.
By comparison, Ecuador has routinely employed executive decrees for public procurement since the global nancial crisis, allowing public entities like China's policy banks to bypass the traditional procurement process established under law. Ecuador's 2008 debt default coincided with the global nancial crisis, but the emergence of Chinese credit quickly became a viable alternative to market-based nancing, helping the country escape austerity. According to former political advisor Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa, Decio Machado, "we used the availability of Chinese nancing as an alternative to Bretton Wood's nancing that imposed conditionality through adjustment programs."
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Ecuador has borrowed a total of 33 percent of its external nancing from Chinese banks since its 2008 debt default (see Table 1 ). Despite recently announcing its intention to diversify its state-owned oil company debts beyond China with countries such as Thailand, direct loans from China still account for 26 percent of the central government's external debt (after adjusting for loans to PetroEcuador). In the process, China has become Ecuador's largest global creditor, with the government having explicitly used Chinese credit lines to cover budgetary shortfalls and large infrastructure projects. Being less subject to global market pressures, Ecuador has moved its government budget sharply into the red from lofty pre-crisis budget surpluses into sizeable de cits today that have averaged 2.1 percent since the 2008 global nancial crisis (Table 2) . 35 Author's interview in Quito, Ecuador, November 10, 2015.
Conclusion
After excessive borrowing led to nancial booms and busts, many countries have sought to insulate themselves from capital volatility, and to varying degrees, diversify away from market governance. In this regard, China's rapid economic expansion in the Western Hemisphere has presented regional governments with an important opportunity. The availability of its patient capital provides governments with an income stream that is independent of austerity-based market nancing.
In this comparative case study analysis, I examined two mixed-market South American economies, Brazil and Venezuela, to test whether this non-conditional funding has the potential to enhance national budgetary autonomy. We found considerable variation within these cases. The Brazilian government -which predominately relies on private procurement and global bond market borrowing to ful ll its public services, and has not directly borrowed from China -targets budget discipline notwithstanding its microeconomic tendency to subsidize credit to consumers and businesses. By contrast, the Venezuelan authorities have tapped non-conditional government-to-government Chinese nancing, which has considerably enhanced their capacity to sustain wider budget de cits and greater levels of economic intervention. Notably, these patterns appear to hold more broadly, with the Argentina and Ecuador cases illustrating that scal de cits tend to widen as Chinese state-owned capital accounts for a higher share of total external nancing.
In conclusion, these ndings offer important new insights for both the international relations and political economy literature, providing a systematic explanation for how the shifting economic power balance between the United States and China affects national political choices. They also advance existing knowledge in comparative politics, in which scholars have widely documented the Latin American left's dissatisfaction with neoliberalism, but have not fully explained the conditions under which these political leaders veer from market-based governance models. This analysis also demonstrates that China's economic engagement may have some unintended consequences. By lending without policy conditions, Chinese nancing may help enhance national policy autonomy and create a development opportunity. However, governments are agents with con icting aims, and such unconditional funding may also be diverted for personal or political gain.
If governments do not invest their borrowing proceeds prudently to bene t long-term societal welfare, it's possible that Chinese lending may sow the seeds for yet another Latin American debt crisis.
